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Since December 2019, China has been experiencing 
a large outbreak of a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) 
which can cause respiratory disease and severe pneu-
monia. We estimated the basic reproduction num-
ber R0 of 2019-nCoV to be around 2.2 (90% high density 
interval: 1.4–3.8), indicating the potential for sus-
tained human-to-human transmission. Transmission 
characteristics appear to be of similar magnitude to 
severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavi-
rus (SARS-CoV) and pandemic influenza, indicating a 
risk of global spread.
On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) was alerted about a cluster of pneumonia of 
unknown aetiology in the city of Wuhan, China [1,2]. 
Only a few days later, Chinese authorities identified 
and characterised a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) 
as the causative agent of the outbreak [3]. The out-
break appears to have started from a single or multiple 
zoonotic transmission events at a wet market in Wuhan 
where game animals and meat were sold [4] and has 
resulted in 5,997 confirmed cases in China and 68 con-
firmed cases in several other countries by 29 January 
2020 [5]. Based on the number of exported cases iden-
tified in other countries, the actual size of the epidemic 
in Wuhan has been estimated to be much larger [6]. At 
this early stage of the outbreak, it is important to gain 
understanding of the transmission pattern and the 
potential for sustained human-to-human transmission 
of 2019-nCoV. Information on the transmission char-
acteristics will help coordinate current screening and 
containment strategies, support decision making on 
whether the outbreak constitutes a public health emer-
gency of international concern (PHEIC), and is key for 
anticipating the risk of pandemic spread of 2019-nCoV. 
In order to better understand the early transmission 
pattern of 2019-nCoV, we performed stochastic simula-
tions of early outbreak trajectories that are consistent 
with the epidemiological findings to date.
 
Epidemic parameters
Two key properties will determine further spread 
of 2019-nCoV. Firstly, the basic reproduction num-
ber  R0  describes the average number of secondary 
cases generated by an infectious index case in a fully 
susceptible population, as was the case during the 
early phase of the outbreak. If  R0  is above the critical 
threshold of 1, continuous human-to-human transmis-
sion with sustained transmission chains will occur. 
Secondly, the individual variation in the number of 
secondary cases provides further information about 
the expected outbreak dynamics and the potential for 
superspreading events [7-9]. If the dispersion of the 
number of secondary cases is high, a small number of 
cases may be responsible for a disproportionate num-
ber of secondary cases, while a large number of cases 
will not transmit the pathogen at all. While super-
spreading always remain a rare event, it can result in 
a large and explosive transmission event and have a 
lot of impact on the course of an epidemic. Conversely, 
low dispersion would lead to a steadier growth of the 
epidemic, with more homogeneity in the number of 
secondary cases per index case. This has important 
implications for control efforts.
Simulating early outbreak trajectories
In a first step, we initialised simulations with one index 
case. For each primary case, we generated second-
ary cases according to a negative-binomial offspring 
distribution with mean  R0  and dispersion  k  [7,8]. The 
dispersion parameter k quantifies the variability in the 
number of secondary cases, and can be interpreted 
as a measure of the impact of superspreading events 
(the lower the value of  k, the higher the impact of 
superspreading). The generation time interval  D  was 
assumed to be gamma-distributed with a shape 
parameter of 2, and a mean that varied between 7 and 
14 days. We explored a wide range of parameter com-
binations (Table) and ran 1,000 stochastic simulations 
for each individual combination. This corresponds to so
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a total of 3.52 million one-index-case simulations that 
were run on UBELIX (http://www.id.unibe.ch/hpc), the 
high performance computing cluster at the University 
of Bern, Switzerland.
In a second step, we accounted for the uncertainty 
regarding the number of index cases n and the date T of 
the initial zoonotic animal-to-human transmissions at 
the wet market in Wuhan. An epidemic with several 
index cases can be considered as the aggregation of 
several independent epidemics with one index case 
each. We sampled (with replacement)  n  of the one-
index-case epidemics, sampled a date of onset for 
each index case and aggregated the epidemic curves 
together. The sampling of the date of onset was done 
uniformly from a 2-week interval around 27 November 
2019, in coherence with early phylogenetic analyses 
of 11 2019-nCoV genomes [10]. This step was repeated 
100 times for each combination of R0 (22 points), k (20 
points),  D  (8 points) and  n  (6 points) for a total of 
2,112,000 full epidemics simulated that included the 
uncertainty on D, n and T. Finally, we calculated the pro-
portion of stochastic simulations that reached a total 
number of infected cases within the interval between 
1,000 and 9,700 by 18 January 2020, as estimated 
by Imai et al. [6]. In a process related to approximate 
Bayesian computation (ABC), the parameter value com-
binations that led to simulations within that interval 
were treated as approximations to the posterior distri-
butions of the parameters with uniform prior distribu-
tions. Model simulations and analyses were performed 
in the R software for statistical computing [11]. Code 
files are available on https://github.com/jriou/wcov.
Transmission characteristics of the 2019 
novel coronavirus
In order to reach between 1,000 and 9,700 infected 
cases by 18 January 2020, the early human-to-human 
transmission of 2019-nCoV was characterised by val-
ues of  R0  around 2.2 (median value, with 90% high 
density interval: 1.4–3.8) (Figure 1). The observed data 
at this point are compatible with a large range of val-
ues for the dispersion parameter k (median: 0.54, 90% 
high density interval: 0.014–6.95). However, our simu-
lations suggest that very low values of k are less likely. 
These estimates incorporate the uncertainty about the 
total epidemic size on 18 January 2020 and about the 
date and scale of the initial zoonotic event (Figure 2).
Comparison with past emergences of 
respiratory viruses
Comparison with other emerging coronaviruses in 
the past allows to put into perspective the avail-
able information regarding the transmission pat-
terns of 2019-nCoV.  Figure 3  shows the combinations 
of  R0  and  k  that are most likely at this stage of the 
epidemic. Our estimates of R0 and k are more similar to 
previous estimates focusing on early human-to-human 
transmission of SARS-CoV in Beijing and Singapore [7] 
than of Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coro-
navirus (MERS-CoV) [9]. The spread of MERS-CoV was 
characterised by small clusters of transmission fol-
lowing repeated instances of animal-to-human trans-
mission events, mainly driven by the occurrence of 
superspreading events in hospital settings. MERS-CoV 
could however not sustain human-to-human transmis-
sion beyond a few generations [12]. Conversely, the 
international spread of SARS-CoV lasted for 9 months 
and was driven by sustained human-to-human trans-
mission, with occasional superspreading events. It 
led to more than 8,000 cases around the world and 
required extensive efforts by public health authorities 
to be contained [13]. Our assessment of the early trans-
mission of 2019-nCoV suggests that 2019-nCoV might 
follow a similar path. 
Our estimates for 2019-nCoV are also compatible with 
those of 1918 pandemic influenza, for which  k  was 
Table
Parameter ranges for stochastic simulations of outbreak 
trajectories, 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak, China, 
2019–2020
Parameter Description Range
Number of values 
explored within 
the range
R0
Basic 
reproduction 
number
0.8–5.0 22 (equidistant)
k Dispersion parameter 0.0110
20 (equidistant on 
log10 scale)
D Generation time interval (days) 9–11,13,16–19 8 (equidistant)
n Initial number of index cases 1–50 6 (equidistant)
T Date of zoonotic transmission
20 Nov–4 Dec 
2019
Randomised for 
each index case
Figure 1
Values of R0 and k most compatible with the estimated size of the 2019 novel coronavirus epidemic in China, on 
18 January 2020
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The basic reproduction number R0 quantifies human-to-human 
transmission. The dispersion parameter k quantifies the risk of 
a superspreading event (lower values of k are linked to a higher 
probability of superspreading). Note that the probability density of 
k implies a log10 transformation.
3www.eurosurveillance.org
estimated [14]. Human-to-human transmission of influ-
enza viruses is characterised by R0 values between 1.5 
and 2 and a larger value of  k, implying a more steady 
transmission without superspreading. The emergence 
of new strains of influenza, for which human popula-
tions carried little to no immunity contrary to seasonal 
influenza, led to pandemics with different sever-
ity such as the ones in1918, 1957 1968 and 2009. It 
is notable that coronaviruses differ from influenza 
viruses in many aspects, and evidence for the 2019-
nCoV with respect to case fatality rate, transmissibility 
from asymptomatic individuals and speed of transmis-
sion is still limited. Without speculating about possible 
consequences, the values of R0 and k found here during 
the early stage of 2019-nCoV emergence and the lack of 
immunity to 2019-nCoV in the human population leave 
open the possibility for pandemic circulation of this 
new virus.
Strengths and limitations
The scarcity of available data, especially on case counts 
by date of disease onset as well as contact tracing, 
greatly limits the precision of our estimates and does 
not yet allow for reliable forecasts of epidemic spread. 
Case counts provided by local authorities in the early 
stage of an emerging epidemic are notoriously unreli-
able as reporting rates are unstable and vary with time. 
This is due to many factors such as the initial lack of 
proper diagnosis tools, the focus on the more severe 
cases or the overcrowding of hospitals. We avoided 
this surveillance bias by relying on an indirect estimate 
of epidemic size on 18 January, based on cases identi-
fied in foreign countries before quarantine measures 
were implemented on 23 January. This estimated range 
of epidemic size relies itself on several assumptions, 
including that all infected individuals who travelled 
from Wuhan to other countries have been detected [6]. 
This caveat may lead to an underestimation of trans-
missibility, especially considering the recent reports 
about asymptomatic cases [4]. Conversely, our results 
do not depend on any assumption about the existence 
of asymptomatic transmission, and only reflect the 
possible combinations of transmission events that lead 
to the situation on 18 January.
Figure 2
Illustration of the simulation strategy, 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak, China, 2019–2020
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The lines represent the cumulative incidence of 480 simulations with R0 = 1.8 and k = 1.13. The other parameters are left to vary according to 
the Table. Among these simulated epidemics, 54.3% led to a cumulative incidence between 1,000 and 9,700 on 18 January 2020 (in red).
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Our analysis, while limited because of the scarcity of 
data, has two important strengths. Firstly, it is based 
on the simulation of a wide range of possibilities 
regarding epidemic parameters and allows for the full 
propagation on the final estimates of the many remain-
ing uncertainties regarding 2019-nCoV and the situa-
tion in Wuhan: on the actual size of the epidemic, on 
the size of the initial zoonotic event at the wet market, 
on the date(s) of the initial animal-to-human transmis-
sion event(s) and on the generation time interval. As 
it accounts for all these uncertainties, our analysis 
provides a summary of the current state of knowledge 
about the human-to-human transmissibility of 2019-
nCoV. Secondly, its focus on the possibility of super-
spreading events by using negative-binomial offspring 
distributions appears relevant in the context of emerg-
ing coronaviruses [7,8]. While our estimate of k remains 
imprecise, the simulations suggest that very low values 
of  k < 0.1 are less likely than higher values < 0.1 that 
correspond to a more homogeneous transmission 
pattern. However, values of  k  in the range of 0.1–0.2 
are still compatible with a small risk of occurrence of 
large superspreading events, especially impactful in 
hospital settings [15,16].
Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that the early pattern of human-
to-human transmission of 2019-nCoV is reminiscent of 
SARS-CoV emergence in 2002. International collabora-
tion and coordination will be crucial in order to con-
tain the spread of 2019-nCoV. At this stage, particular 
attention should be given to the prevention of possible 
rare but explosive superspreading events, while the 
establishment of sustained transmission chains from 
single cases cannot be ruled out. The previous experi-
ence with SARS-CoV has shown that established prac-
tices of infection control, such as early detection and 
isolation, contact tracing and the use of personal pro-
tective equipment, can stop such an epidemic. Given 
the existing uncertainty around the case fatality rate 
Figure 3
Proportion of simulated epidemics that lead to a cumulative incidence between 1,000 and 9,700 of the 2019 novel 
coronavirus outbreak, China, on 18 January 2020
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MERS: Middle East respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus; SARS: severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus.
This can be interpreted as the combinations of R0 and k values most compatible with the estimation of epidemic size before quarantine 
measures were put in place. As a comparison, we show the estimates of R0 and k for the early human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV in 
Singapore and Beijing and of 1918 pandemic influenza [7,9,14].
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and transmission, our findings confirm the importance 
of screening, surveillance and control efforts, particu-
larly at airports and other transportation hubs, in order 
to prevent further international spread of 2019-nCoV.
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